2013
Q.
Some of the things that I found very interesting was reading about the Tokaimura incident, however I do think it would be really fun to learn more about the Fukushima. In general which of these two events is consider to have been a worse disaster? Seeing as one is nature based and the other seems more human error based.
A. Also, at Tokaimura people were actually killed and others made very sick – there was no plan and the notifications and responses were terrible. At Fukushima no one was killed or injured, and there were good plans, trained workers and the notifications and responses were appropriate, but the amount of radiation was many times greater and there will be vastly more radioactive waste material.
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***Q. There was a comment in the technical memo that the LA Times reported the three most severely exposed workers were not wearing dosimeter badges. They [the badges] were some 160 yards from the tank. Hmmmm .. wouldn't these be for measuring vapors not radiation (?).
A. Film badges are "dosimeters." The problem after the fact was that the exposure of the workers was not known. Actually, at that level, it might have wiped out the film badge as well. Also, this is just another indication of very sloppy management, there is no point in having the dosimeters, if they are not worn by the worker.
*Q. There was also an issue of a spigot that was easier to use on the second vessel, which was circular and not the proper-shaped vessel. Seems to be another engineering control that should be addressed. The design was difficult (?) for workers to use.
A. Yes and here may be a moral or ethical problem as well. Use of the other vessel was faster. Shortsighted management often turns its head to unsafe worker practices, if those unsafe practices speed production. After an accident, management self-righteously says, "we told (those dopes) to do it the right way." In my moral code, and it's the law in the US as well, the issue is the "(management) person who should have known" and "had the authority to remedy the situation." Enforcing that obviates the "but I told them" argument.
Q. The whole Tokaimura was interesting and something I had never heard of before. I would love to see a summary of the final report and recommendation on that incident.
A. I remember about six months later one of the workers was still alive. I have not heard much either.
Q. Could you summarize the items that the class found for the Tokaimura owner to do? I am curious to see what everyone came up with (what I missed).
A. You didn't miss much. Actually many of the items are redundant in the readings and a few are contradictory. My biggest problem is that the accident was "not creditable." But it happened. Yet in my work as a health and safety expert, I routinely judged possibilities as "unlikely," although I avoided the term "impossible."
Q. There was a comment in the technical memo that the LA Times reported the three most severely exposed workers were not wearing dosimeter badges. They [the badges] were some 160 yards from the tank. Hmmmm .. wouldn't these be for measuring vapors not radiation (?).
A. Film badges are "dosimeters." The problem after the fact was that the exposure of the workers was not known. Actually, at that level, it might have wiped out the film badge as well. Also, this is just another indication of very sloppy management, there is no point in having the dosimeters, if they are not worn by the worker.
Q. What about other monitoring devices to indicate before Thursday that radiation levels may be increasing or at inappropriate levels.
A. Why bother to measure something that can't happen? Until it does.